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Abstract: Erik Wielenberg seeks to advance his critique of the kalām 
cosmological argument by putting forward three further criticisms of the 
view that God is temporal since the moment of creation. It is seen that these 
criticisms are misconceived and do not take cognizance of what I have written 
elsewhere. 
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I am grateful to the guest editors of TheoLogica for this opportunity to reply to Erik 
Wielenberg’s counter–response to my response to his critique of a theistic account 
of the origin of the universe. His counter–response is prompted by the fact that my 
response was to an unrevised version of his article that differed somewhat from the 
revised, final version, which I had not seen. To make clear the crucial difference, I 
here exhibit the original version (OV) and the final version (FV): 
 
OV.  “God must be temporal at t1 because the universe exists at t1; yet He 
must be timeless at t1 in order to have the power to create the universe at t1.”  
 
FV: “God must be temporal at t1 because the universe exists at t1; yet He must 
be timeless at t1 in order to have, at t1, the power to create the universe.” 
 
(OV) does not specify when God has the power in question, whereas (FV) does; and 
(OV) specifies the power to create the universe at t1, whereas (FV) specifies simply the 
power to create the universe.  
Had I seen (FV), my response would have been that it ascribes to me a logically 
incoherent view to which I do not subscribe. It is logically incoherent to say that a 
timeless God has at t1 a certain power. A timeless God does not even exist at t1, 
much less possess any properties at that time. Something that does not exist at a time 




cannot possess any properties at that time, since there is literally nothing then to 
possess them.  
So God must exist at t1 in order to have at t1 the power to create the universe. 
Indeed, along with considerations stemming from God’s knowledge of tensed facts, 
God’s causal relation to the universe at t1 is the motivation for my maintaining that 
God is temporal since the moment of creation. My studied view, defended at length, 
is that God is timeless sans creation and in time since the moment of creation.1 
Now in his counter–response, Wielenberg makes three further claims, which I 
shall consider in order. My view allegedly:  
(i) is at odds with my characterization of the universe as a temporal effect of a timeless 
cause. Even if this charge were true, it would at best show that I am guilty of 
infelicitous use of language, not that my studied view is incoherent or false. I have 
stated and defended my studied view clearly, and any infelicitous expressions need 
to be read in that light. But are expressions like “given that time had a beginning, 
the cause of the beginning of time must be timeless” infelicitous? Not if the singular 
term “the cause of the beginning of time” is used referentially rather than 
attributively.2 To illustrate, the man who says, “I never kissed my wife before we 
were married” (because at that time she was not his wife!) is using the term “my 
wife” attributively, not referentially, in order to make a joke. More seriously, we can 
speak referentially of God sans the universe as the cause of the universe in order to 
convey that the cause of the universe did not itself spring into being at the moment 
of creation. 
(ii) renders God in His timeless phase causally inert and so leaves us with no grounds to 
posit the existence of a timeless God. I prefer to characterize God sans the universe as 
causally inactive rather than inert. But why posit the existence of a timeless God? As 
I indicated in my response to Wielenberg, the proponent of the KCA need not be 
committed to divine timelessness. He could hold with Lucas, Swinburne, and 
Padgett that God exists sans the universe in a sort of non–metric time in which 
temporal intervals and events do not exist, so that the impossibility of an infinite 
regress of events does not entail a beginning of time itself. But I have argued at some 
length for the greater plausibility of the view that God is timeless sans creation, and 
there is no reason to rehearse those arguments here.3  
 
1 God, Time and Eternity (2001). For a popular account see my Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s 
Relationship to Time (2001). 
2 On this distinction see Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” (1966, 287). 
3 God, Time and Eternity, chap. 9; Time and Eternity, pp. 233-36. It occurs to me upon further 
reflection that perhaps Wielenberg is asking why posit God at all. The answer is that if God exists at 
t1 but not sans the universe, then He begins to exist at t1 and so would require a cause. Recall what I 
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(iii) opens the door to non–theistic explanations of the beginning of the universe. This is 
a very important objection which is independent of my view of divine eternity. Why 
not say that the initial cosmological singularity is the explanation of the beginning 
of the universe? Well, various reasons: The universe is comprised of spacetime and 
its boundary points, so that if the universe began to exist, there must be a 
transcendent cause of the universe. Moreover, the initial singularity, though not in 
physical time, is plausibly in metaphysical time, since it is the earliest state of the 
universe and the universe evolved from it. It comes into being and passes away. It 
is inaccurate to think, as Wielenberg says, that “When First Expansion occurs, 
Singularity ‘enters’ time.” No, the initial cosmological singularity lasts no longer 
than an instant and is nowhere to be found today. As such it is neither timeless nor 
past eternal and so requires a cause. Furthermore, even if the singularity were 
timeless, it is causally connected with the temporal universe, and the only way to 
explain the rise of a temporal effect with a beginning from a timeless cause, as I have 
argued, is if that cause is a personal agent endowed with freedom of the will.4 
So while I am grateful to Wielenberg for drawing further attention to such 
fascinating issues, I do not think that his further critique is any more successful than 
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said in my original response to Wielenberg’s second alleged contradiction concerning how on a 
relational view of time God’s creating the universe brings about the first moment of time. 
4 The Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979, 149-53). 
 
